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We formulate an optimum-taxation model, where parents leave bequests to their descendants 
for altruistic reasons. In contrast to the standard model, individuals differ not only in earning 
abilities, but also in initial (inherited) wealth. In this model a redistributive motive for an 
inheritance tax - which is equivalent to a uniform tax on all expenditures - arises, given that 
initial wealth increases with earning abilities. Its introduction increases intertemporal social 
welfare or has an ambiguous effect, depending on whether the bequeathing generation can 
adjust their behaviour and whether the external effect related to altruism is accounted for in 
the social objective. 
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 1 Introduction
Taxation of estates or inheritances remains to be a heavily discussed issue in tax policy.
There are strong movements in many countries to abolish the tax on bequests (it was in
fact repealed in Sweden and Austria recently), because it is considered immoral (named
a "death tax") and adverse to savings.1 On the other hand, proponents mainly stress its
redistributive e⁄ect, they see the tax as an instrument for increasing equality of oppor-
tunity. The existence of such controversial views may be the consequence of deep-going
ideological di⁄erences, but it may also be attributed to the missing evidence o⁄ered by
economists as to the e⁄ects of a bequest tax.
In the present paper we want to provide new evidence on this tax by introducing
an important aspect into the theoretical analysis, which has been neglected by earlier
contributions: as a consequence of having rich or poor parents, individuals are endowed
with di⁄ering inherited wealth. That is, inheritances create a distinguishing characteristic,
which is responsible for inequality within a generation. Indeed, the view that inheritance
taxation increases equality of opportunity seems to be based on this observation.
Nevertheless, di⁄erences in initial wealth are left out in the usual welfare-theoretic
analysis of estate taxation, which is based on the optimum-taxation model in the tradition
of Mirrlees (1971) and concentrates on di⁄erences in earning abilities only. In such a
restricted framework, redistribution is best performed via an income tax alone, there is no
need for any indirect tax (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976). As a consequence, there is no role
for a tax on bequests either, because leaving bequests can be seen just as a speci￿c way
of spending income, like on consumption of goods2. In this framework, even a subsidy on
bequests may be considered desirable, if the view that bequests (or, more generally, gifts)
create twofold utility, for the donor as well as for the donee, is taken into account - in
1But such a tax still exists in most European countries. In the USA, President Obama plans to make
the estate tax permanent at a rate of 45% for estates above $3,5 mill. (Wall Street Journal, Sep. 19, 2009).
The rate was 55% in the Clinton era.
2To be precise, this result follows, if preferences are weakly separable between consumption and leisure.
Otherwise, complementarity or substitutability of some consumption good with leisure plays a role (Corlett
and Hague 1953). Saez (2003) considers heterogeneity in tastes and argues, in particular, that more
educated individuals have a higher savings rate, which makes taxation of savings desirable. In this paper,
we introduce heterogeneity in initial wealth and analyse its consequences.
1other words, if a positive externality is attributed to leaving bequests, which calls for a
Pigouvian subsidy.3
However, the situation is fundamentally di⁄erent, if the fact that the individuals of
some generation are already endowed with (di⁄ering) initial wealth, as a result of be-
quests left by their parents, is introduced into the model: then individuals di⁄er in two
characteristics: earning abilities and initial wealth. The aim of this paper is to analyse
the role of inheritance taxation, together with optimum taxation of labour income, in an
appropriately extended framework. We show that the existence of di⁄ering initial wealth
matters indeed for determining the welfare e⁄ect of inheritance taxation.
To our knowledge, prior contributions did not attempt to provide such an analysis.
There are some papers that discuss the consequences of (di⁄ering) initial wealth on the
structure of indirect taxes and on the desirability of capital income taxation (Boadway et
al. 2000, Cremer et al., 2001, 2003). However, these authors assume that bequests are
unobservable, they analyse to which extent other taxes can be designed as surrogates. In
contrast, we model bequests (that is, initial wealth of the descendants) as being observable
(as is labour income), because this is the assumption on which actual tax systems rely.4
We assume generally that bequests are motivated by pure altruism of the parents, which
means that consumption of their descendants is an argument in their utility function. As
is well known, this formulation leads to a model of dynasties (Blumkin and Sadka 2003,
among others) and implies, in particular, a precise rule of how estates are allocated to
the members of the subsequent generation: at death, parents leave all wealth to their own
children.
To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we consider an economy which consists of
two individuals, and we begin with a model of two generations. The individuals in the
parent generation have di⁄ering earning abilities and they use their labour income for
consumption and for leaving bequests to their immediate descendants, who live on inher-
itances only. The planner determines an optimum nonlinear tax on labour income of the
3See e. g., Blumkin and Sadka 2003 or Farhi and Werning 2008.
4This is not to deny that there are problems of observability. However, in this paper we concentrate on
the discussion of whether such a tax is welfare-enhancing, assuming that it can be su¢ ciently enforced.
2parents and considers, in addition, the introduction of a proportional tax on bequests or on
inheritances. This is the standard framework for the analysis of bequest taxation5 - where
di⁄erences in initial wealth of the parents are completely left out - and we formulate the
above-mentioned result that a subsidy on bequests increases intertemporal social welfare,
if the external e⁄ect is observed, that is, if there is "double-counting" of the welfare e⁄ect
of bequests.6 Otherwise it is optimal to have neither a tax nor a subsidy.
Next, we introduce into the model the fact that parents are endowed with given initial
wealth. We show that then a (speci￿c) tax on bequests left by the parent generation has
an ambiguous e⁄ect on intertemporal social welfare. The positive externality associated
with bequests calls for a subsidy, as above, but there is also an argument for a tax for
redistributive reasons: taxing bequests of the parents means indirectly taxing inheritances
(initial wealth) received by the parent generation. Imposing the tax and redistributing its
revenues to the individuals through an appropriate adaptation of the income tax is welfare-
increasing, provided that high-able individuals have larger initial wealth than low-able.7
If the external e⁄ect is ignored by the planner, only the latter e⁄ect occurs.
Moreover, we show that, for obvious reasons, a direct tax on the given inheritances of
the parent generation is de￿nitely desirable, because it allows more redistribution than the
optimum labour income tax alone. It has no adverse e⁄ects on welfare of later generations,
if its revenues are used to adapt the income tax appropriately. What is more surprising,
however, is that completely the same result arises for a general tax on all expenditures
of the parent generation (that is, on their consumption as well as on the bequests they
leave to their descendants). Both taxes are equivalent, though the tax on initial wealth is
a lump-sum tax, while the expenditure tax is not.
In a next step we account explicitly for the fact that the parent generation inherited
5For our main point, namely the consequences of unequal initial wealth, it is inessential whether one
works with a proportional tax (as do Blumkin and Sadka 2003) or a nonlinear (Farhi and Werning 2008).
6Double-counting refers to the case that welfare of both generations of the dynasty is summed up in
the social objective. As welfare of the ￿rst generation already includes welfare of the second generation,
the latter is counted twice. For a classi￿cation of bequest motives see Cremer and Pestieau (2006).
7A positive correlation between initial wealth and abilities appears quite plausible, because empirical
evidence shows that individuals with higher income also own more wealth (e.g., Diaz-GemØnez et al. 2002)
and that a substantial part of wealth results from inheritances (Gale and Scholz 1994). We will assume
the existence of such a positive correlation in the following.
3their initial wealth from the previous generation. That is, we introduce an earlier third
generation (of grandparents) into the model, who also have di⁄ering earning abilities,
identical to those of their respective descendants, and di⁄ering initial wealth (positively
correlated with abilities). They also have altruistic preferences, caring for consumption of
the following two generations of their dynasty; clearly, bequests left by the grandparent
generation constitute initial wealth of the subsequent parent generation. The social plan-
ner determines optimum nonlinear labour income taxes for these two generations, knowing
that abilities remain the same within a dynasty8 and being able to credibly commit not
to change taxes in the following periods.
In this framework, we ￿rst consider the case that grandparents cannot change their
behaviour any more when the tax on their bequests (i.e., on inheritances of their descen-
dants) is introduced. We ￿nd that this tax still increases social welfare unambiguously,
even if welfare of the grandparents (who might be expected to be negatively a⁄ected) is
included in the social welfare function. The intuitive reason is that altruistic grandpar-
ents, caring for consumption of their descendants, recognise the additional redistribution
associated with this tax.
However, the situation changes, if we consider a model where the grandparent genera-
tion can adapt their decisions and this has to be observed by the planner. As grandparents
react in a way which ignores the positive externality of bequests, a negative impact occurs
in addition to the positive redistributive e⁄ect. Hence, the overall e⁄ect on intertemporal
social welfare of a tax on inheritances of the parent generation (i.e., on bequests left by the
grandparent generation) is ambiguous, if the externality is observed by the planner; other-
wise the e⁄ect is positive. This result is clearly similar to that found in the two-generation
model discussed above (for a tax imposed on the bequests of the parent generation).
On the other hand, if instead a tax on (exogenously given) initial wealth of the grand-
parent generation or - equivalently - a uniform tax on all their expenditures for consump-
tion and bequests is imposed, and their optimum income tax is adapted appropriately,
8Thus, we do not consider the intertemporal wedge related to the "inverse Euler equation", which
characterises the optimum allocation, if there is uncertainty over future abilities (see, e. g., Golosov et. al.
2007). In contrast, we concentrate on the pure welfare consequence of (taxation of) inheritances.
4this again has a de￿nite positive e⁄ect on social welfare, just as described above for such
taxes in the two-generation model.
Finally, we show that essentially the same results can be derived in a more complex
model with an arbitrary number of individuals and a stochastic relationship between
initial wealth and abilities: the already familiar redistributive e⁄ect occurs, if expected
inheritances increase with abilities.
Altogether, our general conclusion is the following: If one considers a model where the
￿rst generation of dynasties is characterised by unequal initial wealth, a redistributive mo-
tive for inheritance taxation arises, given that inherited wealth is positively correlated with
earning abilities. A negative welfare e⁄ect on future generations, because the bequeathing
generations react to the tax, counteracts this positive (redistributive) e⁄ect, but only if
one assumes double-counting of bequests in the social welfare function. Otherwise, there
is a de￿nite positive welfare e⁄ect.
The plan of the paper is as follows: As a starting point (Section 2) we consider bequest
taxation in the standard model with two generations and two types of individuals di⁄ering
only in earning abilities. In Section 3 the existence of unequal initial wealth is introduced.
In Section 4 the consequences of various taxes are analysed in an extended model with
three generations. Section 5 contains a generalisation to more types of individuals and
a stochastic relation between initial wealth and abilities. Section 6 provides concluding
remarks.
2 The standard model
We start with the simplest version of a model of dynasties, similar to that in Blumkin
and Sadka (2003) or in the ￿rst section of Fahri and Werning (2008). There are only
two dynasties (L;H) and each comprises two generations (a parent and a child). We
assume that each generation lives for one period and consists of two individuals only.
The children do not work at all, they live on inheritances. The parents (generation t),
however, do work; they di⁄er in earning abilities !L < !H. By working lit units of time
they earn gross income zit = !ilit and net income xit, i = L;H, which they spend for
5own consumption cit and bequests bit. Each parent has a single child, to whom she leaves
all her bequests. Thus, bit is equal to child consumption cit+1. The government imposes
a nonlinear labour income tax in period t and a proportional tax on bequests left by
generation t, i.e., on inheritances of generation t + 1.
Identical preferences of the parents are characterised by pure altruism and can be
described by the concave utility function u(cit;cit+1;lit); strictly increasing in cit and cit+1,
strictly decreasing in lit. Child consumption is assumed to be a normal good, it enters
the utility function like own consumption. Utility U (cit+1) of the child depends only own
consumption cit+1, with U : R ! R strictly concave and increasing. In later sections,
when we introduce a third generation, we will assume additive separability with respect
to generations and write the parent￿ s utility as e U(cit;lit) + ￿U (cit+1), where 0 < ￿ ￿ 1 is
a discount factor, usually interpreted as representing the "degree of altruism".9
Let, for given net income xit, gross income zit and a tax rate ￿bt on bequests (= child
consumption), indirect utility of a parent for a general utility function u be de￿ned by
vi
t (xit;zit;￿bt) ￿ maxfu(cit;cit+1;zit=!i) j cit + (1 + ￿bt)cit+1 ￿ xitg (1)
We ￿rst take the tax on bequests as ￿xed at ￿bt = 0 and consider a benevolent government
which can impose an optimum nonlinear income tax in order to maximise the welfare of
the two generations. This is equivalent to determining two bundles (xLt;zLt), (xHt;zHt),
subject to a self-selection constraint and the resource constraint. With a social discount











t (xHt;zHt;￿bt) ￿ vH
t (xLt;zLt;￿bt); (3)
xLt + xHt ￿ zLt + zHt + ￿bt(cLt+1 + cHt+1) ￿ gt: (4)
9In a still more speci￿c version, additivity is assumed also between consumption and labour with utility
out of consumption being the same for the parent and the child: u(cit;cit+1;lit) = U (cit) + ￿U (cit+1) ￿
h(lit), where h : R ! R; strictly convex and increasing, describes disutility of labour (see, e.g., Fahri and
Werning 2008).
6Here we assume that the government puts su¢ cient weight fL > fH on the low-wage
individual, such that in the optimum further downward redistribution is desired. Therefore
we can neglect the self-selection constraint for the low-wage individual, while the self-
selection constraint for the high-wage individual is binding.10
Note that in case of ￿ = 0 the social objective (2) is equal to welfare of the parent
generation (which includes welfare of the descendants). In case of ￿ > 0, the descendants￿
welfare is included separately as well, which means double-counting, as mentioned in the
Introduction.
As a next step we ask how the introduction of a tax on bequests a⁄ects social welfare.
Let S1(￿bt) be the optimum value of the foregoing problem and ￿ the Lagrange multiplier
of (3). We ￿nd



















This e⁄ect is negative, given weak separability of preferences between consumption and
labour time and ￿ > 0. It is zero, if ￿ = 0:
Proof. See Appendix.
In this formula, U0
it+1 ￿ dU=dcit+1 for i = L;H: The upper index "com" denotes
compensated demand and [L] refers to "mimicking", that is, a situation where the high-
wage individual opts for the bundle designed for the low-wage individual.
The essential point of this result is that, with the mild assumption of weak separability
of preferences between consumption and labour, a subsidy on bequests is welfare increas-
ing: Weak separability implies that the second term in the formula of Proposition 1, i.e.
the e⁄ect on the self-selection constraint, is zero, because the di⁄erence in bequests left by
type H, when mimicking type L, and the bequests of type L, is zero: cHt+1[L] = cLt+1.11
10We further assume that agent monotonicity (Seade 1982) is ful￿lled for general preferences








t =@xHt) at any admissible (x;z).
11Mimicking by type H means that she chooses the same bundle of net and gross income as type L.
Then the only di⁄erence between the two types is in labour supply: type H can earn the same gross income
7On the other hand, the ￿rst term, the direct welfare e⁄ect on the child generation t + 1
is negative if ￿ > 0; because the e⁄ect of an increase of ￿bt on compensated demand for
cit+1(= bit) is always negative.
This ￿nding is clearly related to the theorem of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), which
tells us that in case of weak separability an optimum nonlinear income tax is a su¢ cient
instrument for redistribution within a generation, there is no role for a tax on a speci￿c
good. The particular issue in the present model is that the good "bequests" (= consump-
tion of the descendant) enters the social welfare function, via both the parent￿ s and the
child￿ s utility. As a consequence of this double-counting of cit+1, a subsidy to internalise
a positive external e⁄ect is desirable.12 Indeed, if ￿ is zero (no double-counting), we have
the Atkinson-Stiglitz outcome.
3 A model with initial wealth
We now introduce the fact that parents already have (di⁄ering) initial wealth. Let eLt and
eHt be initial wealth of the two types, which is inherited from the previous generation, but
is taken as exogenous for the moment. We want to clarify the role of three di⁄erent ways of
taxing bequests, namely of a proportional tax ￿bt on bequests as before, a proportional tax
￿et on initial (inherited) wealth of the parents, and a proportional tax ￿t on all expenditures
of the parents, i.e., a uniform tax rate on their own consumption cit and on bequests
bit = cit+1. The de￿nition of the indirect utility function (1) is modi￿ed to
vi
t (xit;zit;eit;￿bt;￿et;￿t) ￿ maxfu(cit;cit+1;zit=!i) j
(1 + ￿t)(cit + (1 + ￿bt)cit+1) ￿ xit + (1 ￿ ￿et)eitg;
(5)
where we assume that not both ￿bt and ￿t exist. As in the model of Section 2, the
government determines the labour income tax for given ￿bt = ￿et = ￿t = 0 by maximising
with less working time. But due to weak separability this does not in￿ uence the decision of how to spend
net income.
12Farhi and Werning (2008) show in a model with an optimal nonlinear tax on bequests, that this tax
is progressive, that is, the marginal subsidy is lower for high-able individuals.
8(2) with respect to the income bundles xit;zit, i = L;H; subject to
vH
t (xHt;zHt;eHt;￿bt;￿et;￿t) ￿ vH
t (xLt;zLt;eHt;￿bt;￿et;￿t); (6)










(cit + cit+1) ￿ gt;
(7)
Let S2(￿bt;￿et;￿t) denote the optimum value of the above maximisation problem with ￿
as the Lagrange multiplier of the self-selection constraint (6).





















In general, the sign of this e⁄ect is ambiguous. The ￿rst term is negative while the second
term is positive, given weak separability of preferences between consumption and labour
and if the high-able individual is endowed with more inherited wealth than the low-able.
The e⁄ect is positive, if ￿ = 0:
b) The welfare e⁄ect of introducing a tax ￿et on inherited wealth or a tax ￿t on expen-



















This e⁄ect is positive, if the high-able individual is endowed with more inherited wealth
than the low-able.
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, the formula describing the e⁄ect of ￿bt is the same as we found in Section 2. Note,
however that now even in case of weak separability we have cHt+1[L] > cLt+1; if eHt > eLt.
That is, as bequests are assumed to be a normal good, the high-able individual - even when
mimicking - will leave more bequests to her descendant, if she is endowed with more initial
9wealth. In that case, if a tax on bequests is introduced, mimicking becomes less attractive
for her, which gives slack to the self-selection constraint and more redistribution via the
income tax becomes possible. This positive welfare e⁄ect counteracts the consequence of
double-counting, which calls for a subsidy (as above the own compensated price e⁄ect is
negative); the overall welfare e⁄ect is ambiguous and depends on the magnitude of both
e⁄ects.
On the other hand, we ￿nd that the consequences of imposing a tax ￿et on initial
wealth or a tax ￿t on the expenditures of the parent generation t are clear-cut: both
increase welfare, if eHt > eLt: All potentially negative welfare consequences of these two
taxes, in particular those on the descendant generation, can be o⁄set by an appropriate
adaptation of the nonlinear income tax. It is interesting to observe that the e⁄ects of
￿et and ￿t are identical, though the ￿rst clearly is a lump-sum tax while the second is
distorting, because expenditures are endogenous.13 The positive welfare e⁄ect of either
tax comes from a relaxation of the self-selection constraint. To get some intuition for this
result, consider the e⁄ect of a small ￿￿et; which increases tax revenues by ￿￿et(eLt +
eHt): Compensating the individuals by an increase in net income ￿xit = ￿￿eteit would
leave welfare of both individuals unchanged. However, as ￿xLt < ￿xHt; if eLt < eHt;
this procedure makes mimicking less attractive and allows, thus, further redistribution of
net income by increasing ￿xLt and decreasing ￿xHt: This raises social welfare. Note,
moreover, that in the formula in b) the social discount factor ￿ does not appear. That is,
the positive e⁄ect occurs whether or not there is double-counting.
Finally it should be noted that in this and the following Section 4 we assume that the
government does not use information on inherited wealth (which is assumed to be observ-
able) to identify individuals according to their earning ability. Namely, if it is publicly
known that the higher-able individual has more inherited wealth, the government could
infer the types from the reported amount eit of inheritances and then apply a di⁄erenti-
ated lump-sum tax as a ￿rst-best instrument. Our assumption that the government does
not follow this strategy is in accordance with actual behaviour of tax authorities and is
13For a further discussion of this issue see Brunner and Pech (2008).
10probably based on the fact that in reality the relation between the two characteristics is
stochastic and allows no such identi￿cation. Therefore, in Section 5 we drop the simplify-
ing assumption of a ￿xed relation between observable inherited wealth and unobservable
abilities and we show that essentially the same results can be derived in a model with a
stochastic relation between initial wealth and abilities.
4 Considering the previous generation
After having demonstrated that (di⁄ering) initial wealth of some generation t provides a
rationale for bequest taxation, we now introduce into our model the fact that this initial
wealth occurs due to bequests left by the previous generation t￿1. In other words, we take
initial wealth eLt;eHt no longer as exogenous, but incorporate the decisions of generation
t ￿ 1 and analyse how this a⁄ects the welfare consequences of bequest taxation.
We assume again that pure altruism motivates the bequest decision of generation
t ￿ 1. That is, this generation care for own activities as well as for the activities of
the following generations. As already mentioned in Section 2, we assume from now on
that the utility function is additively separable with respect to generations (similar to
Blumkin and Sadka 2003); hence the utility function of an individual i of generation
t ￿ 1 reads e U(cit￿1;lit￿1) + ￿e U(cit;lit) + ￿2U(cit+1); with a speci￿c (additive) version
being U(cit￿1) ￿ h(lit￿1) + ￿U(cit) ￿ ￿h(lit) + ￿2U(cit+1): Now a dynasty comprises three
generations, and we assume that also generation t￿1 consists of two types of individuals,
with abilities !i; i = L;H, resp. Moreover, each individual knows that her descendant,
to whom she leaves all her bequests, has the same earning ability. Members of generation
t ￿ 1 have initial wealth eLt￿1;eHt￿1.
In a ￿rst step, we are interested in the e⁄ects of a tax ￿et, imposed on inheritances
received by generation t, and of a tax ￿t, imposed on all expenditures of generation t,
where we assume that generation t ￿ 1 are already aware of these taxes. Now indirect
11utility of generation t ￿ 1 is de￿ned as
vi
t￿1 (xit￿1;zit￿1;xit;zit;eit￿1;￿et;￿t) ￿ maxfe U(cit￿1;
zit￿1
!i




￿2U(cit+1) j cit￿1 + eit ￿ xit￿1 + eit￿1;(1 + ￿t)(cit + cit+1) ￿ xit + (1 ￿ ￿et)eitg;
where for the moment we leave out taxes other than ￿et;￿t. However, note that an
inheritance tax ￿et in period t is equivalent to a bequest tax ￿bt￿1 in period t￿1. (To see
the relation formally, one has to interpret eit as net bequests, write the budget constraints
as cit￿1+(1+￿bt￿1)eit ￿ xit￿1+eit￿1; cit+cit+1 ￿ xit+eit and set ￿bt￿1 = ￿et=(1￿￿et)).
An important property of vi
t￿1 is its recursive structure:
vi




t(￿) j cit￿1 + eit ￿ xit￿1 + eit￿1g (9)
with vi
t being de￿ned as
vi
t (xit;zit;eit;￿et;￿t) ￿ maxfe U(cit;
zit
!i
) + ￿U(cit+1) j
(1 + ￿t)(cit + cit+1) ￿ xit + (1 ￿ ￿et)eitg:
(10)
Before we investigate the extended model in detail, it is instructive to ask what is the
welfare e⁄ect of ￿et and ￿t, if we still assume that generation t ￿ 1 have already made
all decisions, in particular concerning bequests. That is, we assume that the bundles
(xit￿1;zit￿1);i = L;H; are given (as well as eit￿1) and, moreover, that generation t￿1 have
already ￿xed their bequests bit￿1 = eit (and own consumption cit￿1). The intertemporal




t￿1 (￿) + vi
t (￿) + ￿U (cit+1)) (2￿ )
with fL > fH denoting welfare weights of the two dynasties, as before. (Note that the
government is assumed to maximise social welfare (2￿ ) in period t, therefore generation
t ￿ 1 is weighted by ￿￿1; but this clearly inessential.)
Though generation t ￿ 1 have made all their decisions, they are a⁄ected by the in-
12troduction of ￿et and ￿t; because they care for consumption of their descendants which
is altered, if in period t additional redistribution is performed through the introduction
of ￿et, ￿t, resp. As there is a higher weight on the low-able type in the social welfare
function, one can expect that this redistribution has a positive e⁄ect, even if generation
t￿1 is included. Indeed, we ￿nd that the same formula as in Proposition 2b) applies. Let
S3 be the optimum value function of maximising (2￿ ) with respect to (xit;zit);i = L;H;
subject to (6) and (7). We ￿nd
Proposition 3 Given that generation t ￿ 1 cannot adjust their behaviour, the welfare




















This e⁄ect is positive, given that within generation t inheritances received by the high-able
individual are larger than those received by the low-able individual.
Proof. See Appendix.
Now we continue with an analysis of the e⁄ects of ￿et and ￿t on welfare of the three
generations, if generation t￿1 can adapt their behaviour. For this purpose, we consider a
model where the government determines optimum nonlinear income taxes for the genera-
tions t ￿ 1 and t, for given tax rates ￿et = ￿t = 0; which means to ￿nd optimum bundles
(xit￿1;zit￿1);(xit;zit); i = L;H:
In order to keep the structure of the problem as simple as possible, we avoid the im-
plications of uncertainty concerning future abilities. Therefore, as already mentioned, we
assume that within a dynasty abilities remain constant over generations, and this is known
by the authority. Then, as an important consequence, the planner only has to observe the
self-selection constraint for the ￿rst generation of the dynasties, later generations cannot
mimic, because their abilities are known to be the same as those of their parents.14
On the other hand, as is usual in Ramsey-type dynamic problems, we also assume that
the government can credibly commit not to change the taxes, which are determined in
14See also Golosov et al. 2007, Diamond 2007.
13period t￿1; in the following period t. Otherwise, as the solution of the planner￿ s problem
is not time consistent, individuals would expect re-optimisation in period t, which would
change their behaviour.
Moreover, we assume that the government has no instrument to transfer resources
over time (this is only performed within dynasties). As a consequence, separate resource
constraints have to observed for the two periods. Let again ￿ denote the social rate for































(cit(￿) + cit+1(￿)) ￿ gt:
Let S4(￿et;￿t) denote the optimum value of the above maximisation problem and ￿
the Lagrange multiplier of the self-selection constraint (12).
Proposition 4 a) Given that generation t￿1 can adjust their behaviour, the welfare e⁄ect



























In general, the sign of this e⁄ect is ambiguous. The ￿rst term is negative, while the second
term is positive, given weak separability between consumption and labour and if within
generation t ￿ 1 the high-able individual is endowed with more inherited wealth than the
low-able. If ￿ = 0; then the e⁄ect is positive.

















In the formula of Proposition 4, e eit = eit(1￿￿et) denotes bequests net of the inheritance
tax and @e ecom
it =@￿et is the compensated e⁄ect of ￿et on net bequests, left by generation
t￿1. @ct
it+1=@xit denotes the e⁄ect of xit on consumption of generation t+1; as determined
by generation t (with given inheritances eit):
It turns out that the condition which is decisive for the introduction of an inheritance
tax in period t is analogous to that of Proposition 2a), which refers to an inheritance
tax in period t + 1 (that is, a tax ￿bt on generation t￿ s bequests) in the model with two
generations only. There is a negative term (the own compensated price e⁄ect @e ecom
it =@￿et),
due to the distortion of the bequest decisions of generation t￿1. The reduction of bequests
now a⁄ects welfare of two subsequent generations t and t+1. On the other hand, there is
a positive e⁄ect on the self-selection constraint, as before: given that in generation t ￿ 1
the high-able type has more initial wealth than the low-able, the former, when mimicking,
will choose higher bequests than the latter, given weak separability of preferences. Then
the introduction of an inheritance tax ￿et allows more redistribution.
Moreover, these welfare e⁄ects, found for the inheritance tax ￿et; are identical to
those of an expenditure tax ￿t: This identity was already found above, in the models
of Proposition 2b and 3, where the e⁄ect was unambigously positive, as the inheritances
of generation t were taken exogenouly given, thus no distortion occured.
In Proposition 3, we found that both taxes ￿et and ￿t increase intertemporal social
welfare of all three generations, if they are introduced at a point in time when generation
t￿1 cannot change their behaviour (but they are a⁄ected by the tax, and this is accounted
for in the social welfare function). Hence, at ￿rst glance, one might expect that the welfare
e⁄ect is the more positive, if generation t￿1 can adapt to the taxes, as they will not react
in a way which reduces own welfare. However, Proposition 4 tells us that the overall
e⁄ect is now ambiguous. This discrepancy can be explained by observing the external
e⁄ect associated with bequests. By adapting to either tax, the individuals of generation
15t￿1 minimise the loss of their own welfare (which includes welfare of future generations),
but not the loss of social welfare. That is, they ignore the external e⁄ect arising with
double-counting of future generations. If ￿ = 0; the e⁄ect of ￿et and ￿t is unambiguously
positive.
It should also be mentioned that the tax ￿et on inheritances of generation t is indeed
equivalent to a tax ￿bt￿1 on bequests left by generation t ￿ 1 (as mentioned above), also
from the perspective of the government. In particular, it is shown in the Appendix that
nothing changes with Proposition 4, if it is assumed that the revenues from the tax run into
the budget of generation t ￿ 1 (instead of t), as might be more appropriate for a bequest
tax. Intertemporal transfer within a dynasty balances the shift of public resources.
In a ￿nal step of this section we turn to the analysis of a tax ￿et￿1 on initial wealth of
the ￿rst generation and of a uniform tax ￿t￿1 on all expenditures of this generation (i.e.
on own consumption cit￿1 and bequests bit￿1 = eit), and show that their consequences
also are analogous to those in the two-generations model. For this, we include taxes ￿et￿1
and ￿t￿1 in the indirect utility function (but neglect ￿et and ￿t):
vi
t￿1(xit￿1;zit￿1;xit;zit;eit￿1;￿et￿1;￿t￿1) ￿ maxfe U(cit￿1;
zit￿1
!i




+￿2U(cit+1) j (1 + ￿t￿1)(cit￿1 + eit) ￿ xit￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿et￿1)eit￿1;cit + cit+1 ￿ xit + eitg
Let, for ￿et￿1 = ￿t￿1 = 0; S5(￿et￿1;￿t￿1) denote the optimum value of the maximisa-
tion of (11) (where vi
t￿1 is de￿ned in (15) and vi
t is de￿ned in (10) for ￿et = ￿t = 0) with


















zit ￿ gt: (18)
16Proposition 5 The welfare e⁄ect of introducing a tax ￿et￿1 on initial wealth or a tax



















This e⁄ect is positive, if within generation t￿1 the high-able individual has more inherited
wealth than the low-able.
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, as in the two-generations model (Proposition 2b), we again ￿nd that a tax on
(￿xed) initial wealth has an unambiguously positive e⁄ect on intertemporal welfare of all
three generations, if within generation t ￿ 1 initial wealth of the high-able individual is
larger than that of the low-able individual. Moreover, this tax is equivalent to a general
tax on all expenditures of generation t￿1. The increase in welfare is due to the additional
redistribution performed through these taxes, as explained earlier. All other welfare con-
sequences, in particular those on the descendant generations t and t ￿ 1, can be o⁄set by
an appropriate adaptation of the nonlinear income tax.15
5 Stochastic inheritances
As explained earlier, an objection against the models of Sections 3 and 4 could be that
with a ￿xed one-to-one relation between abilities and inherited wealth it would be possible
for the social planner to identify individuals according to their earning abilities by their
inherited wealth and to impose a ￿rst-best tax. In reality, no tax authority follows this
strategy, because the relation between inherited wealth and abilities is not ￿xed, but
stochastic. In order to capture this issue, we now generalise the problem of the previous
Section 4 by extending the number of individuals (or dynasties) to some K ￿ 2 and by
assuming a stochastic relationship between abilities and initial wealth. Let !1 < !2 <
::: < !K be the earning abilities, again identical for the generations t ￿ 1 and t. The
vector of initial wealth eit￿1 ￿ 0 of the individuals i = 1;:::;K is now a random variable,
15Let us ￿nally mention that the results of this Section can also be shown to hold in a model where each
dynasty comprises N generations (not just three).
17with B ￿ RK+ as its supports and with joint distribution F : B ! R. We assume that





eit￿1 is the same for any realisation of eit￿1 and e
ag
t￿1 is
known by the government. For any vector of realisations eit￿1; indirect utility vi
t￿1 and vi
t
is de￿ned as in (8) and (10), but for convenience we assume in this section that utility is
linear in t + 1-consumption, i.e. U(cit+1) = ￿cit+1; with ￿ > 0.
In order to determine the optimum nonlinear income tax for given taxes ￿et;￿t; the
planner￿ s problem is to ￿nd bundles (xit￿1;zit￿1); (xit;zit) which maximise expected ag-

































[cit(eit￿1;￿);￿) + cit+1(eit(eit￿1￿);￿)]dF ￿ gt:
Quasilinear preferences imply that di⁄erent realisations of eit￿1 have an income e⁄ect only
on cit+1 (and eit); while cit￿1 and cit are una⁄ected. In particular, if we denote by e0
it and
c0
it+1 inheritances and bequests, resp., of individual i of generation t; for the case eit￿1 = 0,
we have for actual values that eit = e0
it + eit￿1; cit+1 = c0
it+1 + eit￿1(1 ￿ ￿et)=(1 + ￿t). It
follows that the self-selection constraints (20) are independent of the particular realisation
of eit￿1, because the same welfare e⁄ect ￿eit￿1(1 ￿ ￿et)=(1 + ￿t) occurs on both sides.16
Moreover, as aggregate inheritances e
ag
t￿1 are taken as constant, the resource constraint
16As is well known, it su¢ ces to consider only the self-selection constraints for adjacent individuals.
Further, due to the order of the welfare weights, the self-selection constraints for less-able types do not




















t￿1(1 ￿ ￿et)=(1 + ￿t)):
Thus, the resource constraint (22) is also independent of the realisations eit￿1: Let S6(￿et;￿t)
denote the optimum value of (19) - (22) and ￿i the Lagrangian multipliers associated with
(20).

















In general, the sign of this e⁄ect is ambiguous. The ￿rst term is negative, while the
second is positive, given weak separability between consumption and leisure and if within
generation t ￿ 1 higher-able individuals have, on average, more initial wealth than lower-
able.17 The e⁄ect is positive, if ￿ = 0:
















With quasilinear preferences the uncompensated e⁄ect of the taxes is equal to the
compensated e⁄ect and the marginal utility of net income is equal to ￿2￿; ￿￿ and ￿ for
generations t ￿ 1, t and t + 1, resp. Moreover, @ct
it+1=@xit = 1; thus the formula in
Proposition 6 is indeed analogous to that in Proposition 4.
17Weak separability implies an additive utility function, as described at the beginning of Section 4. It
should be mentioned that this is compatible with our assumption of quasilinearity only if utility out of
consumption for the generations t ￿ 1 and t is strictly concave (and di⁄erent from U(ct+1) = ￿ct+1):
Otherwise, because of ￿ < 1; no bequests would be chosen.
196 Conclusion
In this paper we have analysed the welfare e⁄ects of estate or inheritance taxation in a
model, which accounts for the fact that initial wealth constitutes a second distinguishing
characteristic of individuals, in addition to earning abilities. In the concluding Section we
summarise our results and add some remarks:
Prior studies using an optimum-taxation framework for the analysis of bequest taxation
have usually worked with a model in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971), which leaves out
di⁄erences in initial wealth.18 Perhaps, one might interpret this model as referring to a
hypothetical original state of a society without those di⁄erences. But we think that this
is not an adequate framework, if an economic appraisal of estate taxation is to be relevant
for the current debate about such a tax. We are now in a world where di⁄erences in initial
wealth - as a result of transfers over generations in the past - already exist. They should
be recognized, and we have demonstrated that they matter for our understanding of the
consequences of bequest taxation.
Indeed, prior studies did not ￿nd a case for taxing estates or inheritances for redis-
tributive reasons, because they neglected di⁄erences in initial wealth, but concentrated on
bequests as a speci￿c way of using income. This lead them to the Atkinson-Stiglitz type
of argument and even to the desirability of a Pigouvian subsidy, in order to correct for the
external e⁄ect associated with gifts.
In contrast, by taking di⁄erences in initial wealth seriously, we were able to show
that such a tax has a redistributive e⁄ect, which increases intertemporal social welfare, if
initial wealth and earning abilities are positively correlated. This may explain why it is
frequently regarded as enhancing equality of opportunity. The welfare-increasing e⁄ect is
unambiguous, if a (proportional) tax on inheritances received from the parents is imposed
at a point in time, when the preceding generation cannot react to the tax any more.
Otherwise, a second, welfare-decreasing e⁄ect (familiar from above, calling for a subsidy)
arises, because the preceding generation adapts to the tax in a way which ignores the
positive external e⁄ect of bequests on later generations.
18With the exception of Brunner and Pech (2008).
20In general, the sign of the total e⁄ect is ambiguous. The size of the second e⁄ect
depends on the parameter ￿, which describes the social rate of discounting the welfare of
future generations. From another perspective, ￿ measures the extent of double-counting,
as welfare of future generations is already accounted for in the utility function of the ￿rst
generation, given their altruistic preferences. If ￿ is set to zero, all taxes considered in
the paper have only a positive, redistributive e⁄ect, irrespective of the timing of their
introduction.
A particularly interesting result is that in our model a tax on inheritances received by
individuals of some generation is completely equivalent to a tax on all their expenditures
for own consumption and for their bequests left to the descendants. An adaptation of the
optimum nonlinear income tax by the planner allows a compensation of the individuals
such that these two taxes have identical consequences on the present, the later and on the
previous generation.
In this paper, we studied the welfare consequences of introducing taxes on inheritances
or expenditures, but we did not characterise optimum values. These obviously are found
by balancing the distorting e⁄ect against the redistributive e⁄ect. In a broader view, too
high tax rates are prevented by the reaction of individuals, who will attempt to conceal
the tax base. This issue has been modelled in Brunner et.al (2010).
In a related paper, Brunner and Pech (2008) studied estate or inheritance taxation
when bequest are motivated by joy-of-giving instead of altruism. That is, (net) bequests
instead of consumption of future generations enter their utility function. Empirically, there
is no clear-cut evidence, which of the two motives dominates actual decisions, probably a
mixture of them (in combination with accidental bequests) applies (see, e.g., Arrondel and
LaferrŁre 2001, Laitner and Juster 1996, Laitner and Ohlssen 2001 and Wilhelm 1996).
The main consequence of the joy-of-giving motive is that bequeathing individuals only care
about taxes directly related to their bequests, but do not care about future taxes that are
imposed on expenditures of the descendant generation. This causes a di⁄erence between
inheritance and expenditure taxation and makes the latter a preferable instrument.
Several questions remain for future research. One concerns the possibility of imposing a
21nonlinear tax on inheritances instead of a proportional one. A further interesting question
is what are the welfare consequences of di⁄ering initial wealth, when taxes on inheritances
or expenditures are introduced permanently, not in a single period only. For such an
analysis one needs to deal with the problem of time inconsistency of the planner￿ s solution,
as in later periods social welfare can be improved through a new decision on tax rates.19
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Let ￿bt = 0: From the Lagrangian to the maximisation problem (2), (3) and (4), we derive


























￿ ￿ = 0; (A2)
where U0
it+1 ￿ dU=dcit+1;i = L;H: The symbol [L] refers to a situation where the high-
wage individual opts for the L-bundle (mimicking) and ￿;￿ denote the Lagrange multipli-
ers corresponding to self-selection constraint (3) and to the resource constraint (4), resp.






















) ￿ ￿(cLt+1 + cHt+1): (A3)
We have @vi
t=@￿bt = ￿cit+1@vi
t=@xit from Roy￿ s identity. Using this and (A1), (A2),

















(cHt+1[L] ￿ cLt+1): (A4)
Finally, application of the Slutsky-equation gives us the formula of Proposition 1.
19A similar problem arises with the result (Chamley 1986, Judd 1985) that taxation of income from
capital should be zero in the long run, which also relies on a technology, available for the government, to
commit to taxes set in the ￿rst period.
22Proof of Proposition 2
Throughout the proof, let ￿bt = ￿et = ￿t = 0: The ￿rst-order conditions to the max-
imisation problem (2), (6) and (7) with respect to xLt and xHt are the same as (A1),
(A2).
a) The formula of Proposition 2a is derived from (A1), (A2) in the same way as shown
in the Proof of Proposition 1. The second term is positive, if eHt > eLt (cit+1 is assumed
to be a normal good).
b) By use of the Envelope theorem, we di⁄erentiate the optimum value S2 with respect




















































First, we use @vi
t=@￿et = ￿eit@vi
t=@xit and @cit+1=@￿et = ￿eit@cit+1=@xit; together
with (A1), (A2), multiplied by eLt;eHt; resp., in (A5), to obtain the formula of Proposition
2b.
Next, we rewrite the budget equation of a parent i as cit + cit+1 = mit; where mit ￿
(xit + eit)=(1 + ￿t): We have @mit=@￿t = ￿(xit + eit)=(1 + ￿2)2 = ￿(cit + cit+1)=(1 + ￿t);
and @cit+1=@xit = (@cit+1=@mit)=(1 + ￿t)). Thus, @cit+1=@￿t = (@cit+1=@mit)@mit=@￿t =
￿(cit +cit+1)@cit+1=@xit: Using this term and @vi
t=@￿t = ￿(cit +cit+1)@vi
t=@xit, as well as







[(cHt[L] + cHt+1[L]) ￿ (cLt + cLt+1)]: (A7)
Substituting the budget equation of individual H when mimicking and that of individual
L, i.e. cHt[L] + cHt+1[L] = xLt + eHt and cLt + cLt+1 = xLt + eLt; resp., into (A7), gives
us the formula of Proposition 2b.
23Proof of Proposition 3
Let ￿et = ￿t = 0: The partial derivative of the optimum value S3(￿et;￿t) of the maximisa-


































































with ￿, ￿ as the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to (6) and (7), resp. Using the
recursive structure (9) of vi
t￿1; together with the fact that e U(cit￿1;zit￿1=!i) and eit are







t=@xit. Applying these formulas,
together with the ￿rst-order conditions of the maximisation problem (2￿ ), (6) and (7) for






































￿ ￿ = 0; (A11)
and proceeding as in the Proof of Proposition 2b, we obtain the formula in Proposition 3.
For @S3=@￿t also the formulas above (A7) are used.
Proof of Proposition 4
Throughout the proof, let ￿et = ￿t = 0: The proof proceeds in several steps.
(i) First, we show that ￿et and ￿t have the same e⁄ect. The ￿rst-order conditions of








































￿ ￿t = 0; (A13)
with ￿ and ￿t denoting the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to (12) and (14), resp. Note
that an increase in xit in￿ uences the welfare position vi
t of an individual i generation t
directly (for given eit), but also indirectly, because generation t ￿ 1 adapt bequests eit.





























































Though not written explicitly, the taxes ￿et;￿t; resp., in￿ uence welfare of generation t in
two ways - directly and indirectly - as described above for xit.20 Thus, @vi
t=@￿et = (￿eit+
@eit=@￿et)@vi
t=@xit. Moreover, we have @vi
t￿1=@￿et = ￿eit@vi
t￿1=@xit: Using these expres-
sions, together with the ￿rst-order conditions (A12) and (A13) multiplied by eLt;eHt;





























Further, we have @vi
t￿1=@￿t = ￿(cit + cit+1)@vi
t￿1=@xit and, due to the direct and
indirect e⁄ect, vi
t=@￿t = [￿(cit + cit+1) + @eit=@￿t]@vi
t=@xit. Using these expressions,
together with the ￿rst-order conditions (A12), (A13), multiplied by (cLt + cLt+1); (cHt +
20Note that both e⁄ects are behind @cit+1=@￿et and @cit+1=@￿t as well, see (A18) below.





























[(cHt[L] + cHt+1[L]) ￿ (cLt + cLt+1)]:























xit; s = t ￿ 1;t;t + 1
which together with @cis=@Bt￿1 = @cis=@xit gives us @cis=@￿et = @cis=@￿t + xit@cis=@xit:
Using this equality for s = t+1; together with eit = cit+cit+1￿xit (the budget equation for
period t at ￿et = ￿t = 0); one ￿nds immediately that @cit+1=@￿et+eit@cit+1=@xit in (A16)
is equal to @cit+1=@￿t + (cit + cit+1)@cit+1=@xit in (A17). Moreover, observing from the
budget equation eit = xit￿1+eit￿1￿cit￿1 for period t￿1 that @eit=@￿et = ￿@cit￿1=@￿et and
@eit=@￿t = ￿@cit￿1=@￿t; the same reasoning gives us @eit=@￿et = @eit=@￿t + xit@eit=@xit
and hence equality of the corresponding bracket-terms in (A16) and (A17). Finally, we
conclude from the period-t budget equations of individidal L and individual H, when
mimicking, that cHt[L] + cHt+1[L] ￿ (cLt + cLt+1) = eHt[L] ￿ eLt: Altogether, we have
shown that the right-hand sides of (A16) andf (A17) are identical, that is, the taxes ￿et
and ￿t have completely the same e⁄ect. In the following we only refer to the e⁄ect of ￿et:
Let ct
it+1(￿) denote child consumption decided by generation t, for given inheritances
eit (and xit;zit;￿et;￿t): Clearly, if eit is appropriate, ct
it+1 is equal to child consumption
26cit+1 decided by generation t ￿ 1, due to the recursive structure of utility:
cit+1(xit￿1;xit;zit￿1;zit;eit￿1;￿et;￿t) = ct
it+1(xit;zit;eit(￿);￿et;￿t); (A18)
with eit(￿) having the same arguments as cit+1(￿): Thus, @cit+1=@￿et = (@ct
it+1=@xit)(￿eit+
@eit=@￿et) and @cit+1=@xit = @ct
it+1=@xit+(@ct
it+1=@xit)@eit=@xit (note that @ct
it+1=@eit =
@ct



























(ii) Next, we show that @eit=@￿et + eit@eit=@xit in the square brackets in (A19) is, at
￿et = 0; equal to the own compensated price e⁄ect @e eit=@￿et, which is negative. (Remem-
ber that e eit = eit(1￿￿et) denotes bequests net of the inheritance tax.) To do so, we make
use of the recursive structure of indirect utility (compare (9) in the text), which allows us
to reformulate the maximisation problem of individual i of generation t ￿ 1 as
vi




t(￿) j cit￿1 +
e eit
1 ￿ ￿et
￿ xit￿1 + eit￿1g: (A20)
This is a standard textbook problem and we can apply the Slutzky equation directly for













knowing that the expenditure function has its standard properties with the compensated
own-price e⁄ect being negative, i.e. @e ecom
it =@￿et < 0:
Further, by use of e eit ￿ (1 ￿ ￿et)eit; we ￿nd that @e eit=@￿et = ￿eit + @eit=@￿et and
@e eit=@xit￿1 = @eit=@xit￿1: Moreover, @eit=@xit￿1 = 1+@eit=@xit (di⁄erentiate the budget
equation cit￿1 + eit = xit￿1 + eit￿1 with respect to xit￿1,xit, resp., i.e., @cit￿1=@xit￿1 +
@eit=@xit￿1 = 1 and @cit￿1=@xit + @eit=@xit = 0 and use @cit￿1=@xit￿1 = @cit￿1=@xit).

















(iii) Finally we show that the welfare e⁄ects found in Proposition 4 do not change when
the revenues from ￿et (or ￿t) are assumed to run into the resource constraint of period


















zit ￿ gt: (A24)
One observes immediately that the derivatives of the optimum value function of max-
imizing (11) subject to (A23), (A24) and to the self-selection contraint (12) with respect
to ￿et;￿t are the same as (A14), (A15), if ￿t is replaced by ￿t￿1 (the multiplier associ-
ated with (A23)). Moreover, the F.O.C.￿ s with respect to xLt;xHt are the same as (A12),











































t=@xit; @eit=@xit￿1 = 1+@eit=@xit




















￿ ￿t￿1 = 0: (A27)
Comparing (A12) and (A27), it follows that ￿t = ￿t￿1: Inspection of the foregoing proof
shows that the results remain valid.
28Proof of Proposition 5
Note ￿rst that for the maximisation problem (11), (16) - (18) the ￿rst-order conditions
look the same as those of the foregoing problem (11) - (14), as in either case all taxes




































@eit=@￿et￿1 = ￿eit￿1@eit=@xit￿1 and @cit+1=@￿et￿1 = ￿eit￿1@cit+1=@xit￿1. Using these
expressions and (A25), (A26), multiplied by eLt￿1;eHt￿1; resp., in (A28), gives us the
formula of Proposition 5.




































Using this, the formulas (A25), (A26) multiplied by (cLt￿1+eLt);(cHt￿1+eHt); resp., and
the fact that @Z=@￿t￿1 = (cit￿1 + eit)@Z=@xt￿1;Z = cit;cit+1;eit from inspection of the







[(cHt￿1[L] + eHt[L]) ￿ (cLt￿1 + eLt)]; (A30)
which is equal to the formula of Proposition 5 (use the budget equations for period t￿1):
29Proof of Proposition 6




























￿ ￿t = 0; i = 1;:::K;
where ￿i;i = 2;:::;K and ￿t denote the Lagrangian variables referring to the self-selection
constraints (20) (￿1 and ￿K+1 are set to zero), and to the resource constraint (22), resp.
[L] indicates mimicking, as before. Note that, as in the Proof of Proposition 4, both - the
direct and the indirect - e⁄ects of xit on the welfare positions of generation t are written

































Due to quasilinear utility, we have at ￿et = ￿t = 0: @vi
t￿1=@xit = ￿2￿; @vi
t=@xit = ￿￿;
@eit=@xit = 0 and @cit+1=@xit = 1: Using this, (A31) is transformed to
￿fi[￿2￿ + ￿￿￿ + ￿2￿] = ￿i￿2￿ ￿ ￿i+1￿2￿ ￿ ￿t; (A33)
which is independent of eit￿1: Multiplying both sides of (A33) with arbitrary eit and




eitfi[￿2￿ + ￿￿￿ + ￿2￿]dF =
Z K P
i=1





Quasilinear utility implies @vi
t￿1=@￿et = ￿eit￿2￿; @vi
t￿1[L]=@￿et = ￿eit[L]￿2￿; @vi
t=@￿et =
￿￿(￿eit + @eit=@￿et) and @cit+1=@￿et = ￿eit + @eit=@￿et (observe the direct and indirect
e⁄ects of ￿et on vi
t and cit+1): Using these terms in (A32) and substituting (A34) into
30(A32) gives (note that
K P
i=1

















Finally, we know that ￿eit+eit[L] is independent of the realisation of eit￿1; thus the second




which gives us the formula in Proposition 6a.

































Similar to the procedure above, we can multiply both sides of (A33) with cit + cit+1 and




(cit + cit+1)fi[￿2￿ + ￿￿￿ + ￿2￿]dF = (A37)
Z K P
i=1




Quasilinear preferences imply @vi
t￿1=@￿t = ￿￿2￿(cit+cit+1); @vi
t￿1[L]=@￿t = ￿￿2￿(cit[L]+
cit+1[L]); @vi
t=@￿t = ￿￿(￿cit ￿ cit+1 + @eit=@￿t) and @cit+1=@￿t = ￿cit ￿ cit+1 + @eit=@￿t:
















(cit + cit+1)￿2￿(￿i ￿ ￿i+1)dF
Similar transformations of (A38) as in a) lead to the formula in Proposition 6b. Note
that in case of mimicking the i+1-individual receives net income xit; therefore the budget
31equation for period t, cit + cit+1 = xit + eit; implies ci+1t[L] + ci+1;t+1[L] ￿cit ￿ cit+1 =
ei+1t[L] ￿ eit: Moreover, with quasilinear utility, @eit=@￿et and @eit=@￿t are identical to
the compensated e⁄ects and these two are already known to be equal from the proof of
Proposition 4.
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